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Case No. 2034G 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit error in determining that 
Pioneer State Bank is not entitled to recover under the subject 
policy of title insurance because a payment of $77,000 made by 
Title Guarantee Company to Pioneer State BanK in February 1982 
to settle claims made on other policies of third parties must be 
credited toward the face amount of Pioneer's $77,000 policy? 
2. Did the District Court commit error in determining 
that Pioneer is not entitled to recover general and 
consequential damages for the fraud of Defendants in issuing a 
fraudulent title policy and later failing to disclose and 
concealing Pioneer's claim under that policy? 
3. Did the trial court commit error in determining that 
Pioneer is not entitled to recover from Title Guarantee for 
Title Guarantee's bad faith refusal to settle to Pioneer's claim 
on the insurance policy? 
4. Did the trial court commit error in determining that 
Pioneer had failed to mitigate its damages? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, The Proceedings Below. 
This action was commenced by Pioneer State Bank, formerly 
known as Western Home Bank ("Pioneer"), to recover compensatory 
and punitive damages against Defendants for breach of a policy 
of title insurance, fraud and a bad faith refusal to pay 
Pioneer's claim under the insurance policy. The case went to 
trial before the Court, the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, on 
June 20 and June 21, 1934. Judgment was thereafter entered in 
favor of all Defendants and against Pioneer, no cause of action, 
on November 9, 1984. [R. 442-443] 
B
* Statement of Facts. 
On or about October 4, 1979, Pioneer made a loan in the 
amount of $70,000 to Defendant Dennis Church ("Church"), 
Defendant Jay Lewis ("Lewis"), Ray Maag and Douglas Church 
2 (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "borrowers"). 
1
 Prior to trial, Defendant Ray Maag was dismissed as a 
party pursuant to stipulation of counsel. 
2 Prior to the filing of this action, Douglas Church 
filed Bankruptcy proceedings and was not named as a 
party herein. 
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That loan was secured by a Trust Deed executed by the borrowers 
conveying to Pioneer a second lien on the Lake Meadows 
Suodivision in Provo, Utah ("Lake Meadows"), and a first lien on 
two Willowbrook condominium units in Provo, Utah. [R. 466, Ex, 
P-l] The borrowers were the sole shareholders, officers and 
directors of Rocky Mountain Title and Abstract Company ("Rocky 
Mountain"). Rocky Mountain was the duly authorized local agent 
for Title Guarantee Company ("Title Guarantee"). [R. 571, 699] 
In order to induce Pioneer to make the loan, the 
borrowers told Pioneer that Lake Meadows was an approved 
subdivision and gave to Pioneer a copy of the subdivision plat 
showing that the subdivision was, in fact, approved by Provo 
City days before the loan was made. [Ex. P-4] 
As a condition to approving the Lake Meadows Subdivision, 
Provo City had required two accesses to the subdivision. The 
main access to the subdivision was from Geneva Road over certain 
property owned by Mr. and Mrs. John Taylor (the "Taylor 
property"). The borrowers had been negotiating with Mr. Taylor 
for this property, but as of October 1979 had not been able to 
obtain a written agreement or deed from Mr. Taylor for the 
conveyance of the property. [R. 615, 625] 
The borrowers told Pioneer they needed the loan in order 
to develop Lake Meadows. However, the main purpose of the loan 
was to replace trust funds held by Rocky Mountain which had been 
wrongfully taken out of the trust account. [R. 560-569, 649] 
Because the loan funds were urgently needed, Douglas Church, the 
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President of Rocky Mountain, with the prior knowledge of 
Defendant Lewis, forged a deed to the Taylor property from Mr. 
and Mrs. Taylor to the borrowers and recorded the deed so that 
the borrowers could get approval from Provo City for the 
subdivision and obtain the loan from Pioneer. [R. 572, 650] 
Defendant Church was informed of this forgery within days after 
it occurred. [R. 641, 703, 707] 
In early October, 1979, almost immediately after the 
forged deed to the Taylor property was recorded, Mr. Taylor 
found out about the forgery, became very angry and the borrov/ers 
knew it would be impossible to negotiate further with Taylor to 
acquire the Taylor property. [R. 706-700] 
Pioneer had done title business with Rocky Mountain prior 
to the borrov/ers seeking a loan. [R. 467] As a condition of 
making the loan, Pioneer required that a lender's policy of 
title insurance be issued in its favor. [R. 471] A lender's 
policy of title insurance was, in fact, issued by Title 
Guarantee through its duly authorized agent, Rocky Mountain, on 
or about November 19, 1979, insuring Pioneer's trust deed in 
second position on Lake Meadows behind a first trust deed in 
favor of Utah Valley Bank and insuring Pioneer's Trust Deed in 
first position on the two condominium units. [Ex. P-3] A copy 
of the title policy is attached as an Addendum to this Brief. 
The title policy misrepresented that the borrowers owned the 
Taylor property and failed to disclose Taylor's interest in the 
property or the forgery or the fact that the subdivision did not 
have the two accesses required by Provo City. Uoae of the 
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Defendants ever informed Pioneer of any of these facts. [R. 
476-477, 550# 554, 561, 571-572, 650] Pioneer would not have 
made the loan had it known of these facts. [R. 401] 
In March, 1980, Mr. Taylor commenced a quiet title action 
on the Taylor property, naming the borrowers, Rocky Mountain, 
Provo City and Pioneer as Defendants. [R. 573; Ex. P-6] Pioneer 
did not know about this lawsuit and there is absolutely no 
evidence that Pioneer was ever served with the Summons and 
Complaint. [R. 477-479, 527-520, 544-545, 554] In order to 
resolve the matter with Mr. Taylor and keep Pioneer from finding 
out about the forgery, Douglas Church went to Pioneer's offices 
in the Spring of 1900 and requested Kent Nelson, the Bank 
officer in charge of the subject loan, to execute a Partial 
Reconveyance of Pioneer's trust deed. Mr. Nelson testified that 
Douglas Church told him that the property covered by the Partial 
Reconveyance was not, in fact, part of Pioneer's security and 
would have no effect on Pioneer's security position. [R. 
474-475, 541-542] Mr. Nelson wrote this information on the copy 
of the Partial Reconveyance which he placed in Pioneer's file. 
[R 474-475; Ex. P-5] Although Douglas Church denied he made 
those representations to Mr. Nelson, Douglas Church admitted he 
failed to inform Mr. Nelson that the Taylor property was covered 
by the Partial Reconveyance or that the Taylor property was, in 
fact, the property providing the main access to the subdivision, 
or that the deed to the Taylor property had been forged in order 
to get the subdivision approved, and that without the Taylor 
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property Lake Meadows was not a legal subdivision and could not 
be developed. [R. 574] Douglas Church further admitted he acted 
like the reconveyance was "no big deal" because he was afraid 
Pioneer might find out what was happening and immediately call 
the loan due. [R. 576, 573-579] Mr. llelson did, in fact, sign 
the Partial Reconveyance. [R. 474; Ex. P-5] 
After the quiet title action was filed, Mr. Taylor 
unilaterally dismissed that lawsuit against Pioneer without 
prejudice. Pioneer did not and was not required to consent to 
the dismissal because it had never been served with the Summons 
and Complaint. In September 1900, the borrowers and Rocky 
Mountain resolved the quiet title action with Mr. Taylor by 
stipulating to a Judgment that the borrowers had no right, title 
or interest in the Taylor property, that the title to the Taylor 
property was vested in Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and that the 
borrowers made no claim whatsoever to any interest to the Taylor 
property. [Ex. P-7] Pioneer was never informed of the Judgment 
which was entered in the Taylor lawsuit based on the borrowers1 
Stipulation. [R. 470-430] 
The borrowers subsequently defaulted on both their loan 
with Pioneer and their loan with Utah Valley Bank which was 
secured by a first lien on the Lake Meadows property. 
Accordingly, in mid-1901, both Utah Valley Bank and Pioneer 
commenced non-judicial foreclosure proceedings on their 
collateral. [R. 400, 403-404; Exs. P-21, 22, 23] On December 
11, 1901, Utah Valley Bank conducted a Trustee's Sale of its 
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first trust deed on Lake Meadows. Without knowledge of the 
forged deed or the fact that the Taylor property was not/ in 
fact/ owned by the borrov/ers/ and the subdivision could not be 
developed/ Pioneer purchased Lake Meadows at the Trustee1s Sale 
for the total sun of $01/631.13. [R. 404; Ex. P-9] 
Shortly after the subject loan was made by Pioneer to the 
borrowers in 1979/ the borrov/ers caused Rocky Mountain to issue 
two other policies of title insurance insuring the two 
Willowbrook Condominium units which served as partial security 
for Pioneer's loan. One title policy was issued in favor of 
Pinecrest Associates in the sum of £130/000.00/ insuring 
Pinecrest Associates in first position on the condominium units. 
[Ex. P-29] The other title policy was issued in favor of the 
Lockhart Company in the amount of $30/000.00, insuring the 
Lockhart Company in first position on these condominium 
3 
units. [Ex. P-30] Rocky Mountain intentionally failed to 
disclose on these two title policies the Pioneer lien which v/as, 
in fact/ in first position on both condominium units. [R. 
637-G30] 
After purchasing Lake Meadov/s at the Utah Valley 3ank 
Trustee's Sale, Pioneer proceeded with its non-judicial 
foreclosure of the two Willowbrook Condominium units. [R. 540; 
Ex. P-24] Shortly thereafter and in January, 1902, both 
In fact. Pioneer was in first position/ Lockhart in 
second position and Pinecrest in third position on the 
condominiums. 
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Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart made claims under their title 
policies against Title Guarantee on the basis that they had been 
insured in first position on the condominiums and the prior lien 
of Pioneer had not been disclosed. [R. G67-663] David Hodgson, 
one of the attorneys for Title Guarantee in the present lawsuit, 
was retained by Title Guarantee to investigate the claims of 
Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart. [R. 667-660] 
During the course of his investigation, Mr. Hodgson was 
told by Provo City of the forged deed and the access problem on 
the Taylor property. [R. 673-674] He was also informed of the 
access problem in January 1902 by the attorney for Pinecrest 
Associates. [R. 672-673; Ex. P-14] In fact, Douglas Church had 
told Title Guarantee about the forged deed and access problem 
back in the Summer or Fall of 1901. [R. 596-597] Title 
Guarantee did not inform Pioneer of what it had learned. [R. 561 
600] Rather, in order to settle the claims with respect to the 
condominiums made by Pinecrest Associates on its £130,000 title 
policy and Lockhart on its $30,000 title policy, and with the 
intent of trying to deprive Pioneer of any future claim which 
Title Guarantee feared would be made on Lake Meadows when 
Pioneer found out about the forged deed and the access problem, 
Title Guarantee paid off Pioneer's lien on the two condominium 
units on February 17, 1902, in the amount of £77,326.90. [R. 
674-676, 693-694] Title Guarantee did not pay Pioneer any sums 
under Pioneer's title policy or pay any of the £01,631.39 
Pioneer had paid in December 1901 to purchase Lake Meadows. [R. 
601, 729-732] 
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When Title Guarantee paid Pioneer the £77,000 to satisfy 
Pioneer's lien on the condominium units. Title Guarantee 
requested and was given by Pioneer the original Promissory Note 
signed by the borrowers, a Partial Assignment of Pioneer's trust 
deed (which Assignment expressly excluded Pioneer's interest in 
Lake Meadows) and the original title policy. Title Guarantee 
did not tell Pioneer that it wanted the policy to try to avoid 
the future claim which it feared Pioneer would make on the Lake 
Meadows property. Pioneer was never asked to, nor did Pioneer 
agree to waive or relinquish any rights on its title policy with 
respect to LaKe Meadows. [R. 560, 677-679, 632-634] 
Pioneer subsequently found out about the forged deed and 
access problem and filed a claim with Title Guarantee under 
Pioneer's title insurance policy on May 26, 1932. [Ex. P-10] On 
July 29, 1932, over two months after the claim was made, Title 
Guarantee denied the claim on two grounds: (1) Pioneer's 
purchase of the Lake Meadows property at the Utah Valley Bank 
Trustee's Sale extinguished Pioneer's Trust Deed on that 
property and therefore purportedly extinguished the insurance 
coverage under the policy; and (2) Title Guarantee asserted it 
had already paid Pioneer $77,326.98 under Pioneer's policy so 
that Title Guarantee had already fully paid the face amount of 
the policy. 
Because of the forged deed and lack of adequate access to 
the subdivision, Lake Meadows is not a valid subdivision and 
Provo City will not allow development of the property. [R. 570, 
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574-575] As a proximate result of the lack of the access over 
the Taylor property, Pioneer was damaged in the amount of 
$100,000, representing the difference between the value of the 
propety as a subdivision of $144,000 and the actual value of the 
property of £36,000. [R. 749-751] In addition, Pioneer suffered 
consequential damages of $20,451.39, representing the taxes 
actually assessed on the property as a subdivision, and the 
taxes that would have been assessed if the property had not been 
a subdivision. [R. 752-753, 765-756] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Title Guarantee breached its policy of title 
insurance and is liable to Pioneer for the $70,000 face amount 
of the policy plus interest. Pioneer's interest in Lake Meadows 
was at all times fully insured by Title Guarantee. The policy 
insured title to the Taylor property and adequate access to Lake 
Meadows. Pioneer's title policy remained in full force and 
effect pursuant to the specific provisions of the title policy 
after Pioneer purchased the Lake Meadows subdivision at Utah 
Valley Bank's Trustee's Sale. No payments have ever been made 
to Pioneer under that title policy. The $70,000 payment made by 
Title Guarantee to Pioneer in February 1902, was made to release 
Pioneer's lien on the Willowbrook Condominiums in order to 
resolve claims on the other policies Title Guarantee had issued 
to Lockhart and Pinecrest Associates on the Willowbrook 
Condominiums and can't be credited toward Pioneer's policy. 
Pioneer never made any claim on those condominiums, and in fact, 
-10-
had no claim to maKe on the condominiums because Pioneer was in 
first position. 
2. Rocky Mountain, Church and Lewis defrauded Pioneer by 
issuing a title policy which misrepresented that the borrowers 
owned the Taylor property and failed to disclose the forged 
deed, that the borrowers did not own the Taylor property and 
that Lake Meadows was not, in fact, a valid subdivision and 
could not be developed. Title Guarantee is liable for the fraud 
of its duly authorized agents. 
3. Title Guarantee defrauded Pioneer by intentionally 
failing to disclose to Pioneer the forged deed and access 
problems and by seeking to extinguish the policy of title 
insurance on Lake Meadows when Title Guarantee paid money to 
Pioneer in February 1902 to settle claims made by third parties 
on other policies on the condominiums. 
4. Title Guarantee is liable to Pioneer for acting in 
bad faith in refusing to settle Pioneer's claim on spurious 
grounds. 
5. Pioneer did not fail to mitigate its damages by 
seeking alternative accesses, and in any event, Defendants did 
not plead failure to mitigate as a defense. 
ARGUMENT 
A. PIOIJEER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER FROM TITLE GUARANTEE 
FOR BREACH OF THE TITLE POLICY. 
It is undisputed that the lender's title policy issued to 
Pioneer by Title Guarantee through Rocky Mountain on November 
19, 1931, insured that the borrowers owned the Taylor property 
suoject only to the first lien of Utah Valley Bank and insured 
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that Lake Meadows had adequate access. The borrowers did not, 
in fact, own the Taylor property. Rather, Douglas Church, with 
knowledge of the other borrowers, knowingly forged a deed to the 
Taylor property so that the Subdivision could be approved and 
the loan from Pioneer ootained. The borrowers subsequently 
stipulated to a Judgment that the Taylor property was in fact 
owned by Mr. and Mrs. Taylor and the borrowers had no interest 
in that property. 
Where title to a portion of an insured property fails, 
the general measure of damages is the diminution in value of the 
entire tract and not just the fair market value of the portion 
of the property to which title failed. See, e.g., Clements v. 
Stewart Title Guarantee Co., 537 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. 1975); llartman 
v. Shambaugh, 630 P. 2d 7 50 (LI.M. 1931); Qverholtzer v. northern 
Counties Title Ins. Co., 253 P.2d 116 (Calif. 1953); Ranchers 
Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers F & II Ins. Co. of Alabama, 190 S.2d 397 
(Miss. 1966); Couch on Ins., 2d, Sec. 57:179. In addition, the 
insured is entitled to recover consequential damages which were 
foreseeable, including those damages caused oy special 
circumstances of which the breaching party was aware. See, 
e.g., Pacific Coast Title Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident and 
Indemnity Co., 325 P.2d 906 (Ut. 1953); Buquo v. Title Guarantee 
and Trust, 100 S.W. 2d 997 (Tenn. 1937); Hartman v. Shambaugh, 
supra.; Burks v. Louisville Title Ins. Co., 121 LI.E.2d 943 (Ohio 
1953); Couch on Ins., 2d, Sec 57:175. 
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The fair market value of Lake Meadows as a subdivision is 
$144,000, whereas the actual value of Lake Meadows because it is 
not a valid subdivision is only $36,000. Pioneer also suffered 
consequential damages in the further sum of $20,451.39 because 
of the fact, known all along by the borrowers, that although 
Lake Meadows could not be developed as a subdivision, the 
property was nevertheless taxed as a subdivision. Pioneer is 
entitled to recover the full amount of these damages, up to the 
$70,000 face amount of the policy, plus interest from Title 
Guarantee. 
Title Guarantee attempted to avoid its obligations on the 
policy by denying Pioneer's claim in July 1902 on two grounds: 
(1) that Pioneer's purchase of Lake Meadows at Utah Valley 
Bank's Trustee's Sale purportedly extinguished Pioneer's Trust 
Deed on the property and, thus, supposedly extinguished 
Pioneer's policy of title insurance; and (2) that in February, 
1902, Title Guarantee fully paid the policy by paying Pioneer 
Bank in excess of $77,000 under Pioneer's policy. Apparently 
recognizing that these grounds were frivolous, Title Guarantee 
attempted to raise in this action two additional grounds for 
denying Pioneer's claim, that is, that the title policy only 
remained in effect as long as the borrowers owed Pioneer a debt 
so that when that debt was paid in February 1902, the title 
policy was extinguished regardless of whether Pioneer was ever 
paid anything under its policy; and that when Title Guarantee 
requested and received from Pioneer the original title policy in 
February 1902, the title policy was extinguished. 
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The trial court did not adopt any of the grounds asserted 
by Title Guarantee for denying Pioneer's claim, but nevertheless 
concluded that Pioneer was not entitled to recover on the title 
policy. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that 
although the £77,000 payment by Title Guarantee to Pioneer in 
February 1932, was not paid to Pioneer under Pioneer's policy as 
argued by Title Guarantee, the payment made by Title Guarantee 
on other policies insuring Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart's 
position on the two Willowbrook Condominium units somehov/ can be 
credited to Title Guarantee's obligations under Pioneer's policy 
and therefore, satisfied Title Guarantee's obligation on 
Pioneer's policy. [R. 426] 
It is respectfully submitted, for the reasons hereinafter 
set forth, that the original grounds asserted by Title Guarantee 
for denying Pioneer's claim are frivolous, that Title Guarantee 
is precluded from asserting additional grounds in this lawsuit 
for denying the claim, and that in any event, the additional 
grounds asserted are without merit. 
1. Pioneer's Policy Was Clearly Still in Effect After 
Pioneer Acquired the Lake Meadows Property. 
Pioneer's acquisition of Lake Meadows at Utah Valley 
Bank's Trustee's Sale did not extinguish Pioneer's the title 
policy. 
Paragraph 2(a) of the policy [Ex. P-3] expressly 
provides that the insurance remains in effect after Pioneer 
acquires title to the property: 
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"Continuance of Insurance After Acquisition of 
Title. This policy shall continue in force as of 
date of policy in favor of an insured who acquires 
all or any part of the estate or interest in the 
land described in Schedule A oy foreclosure, 
trustee's sale, conveyance in lieu of foreclosure, 
or other legal manner which discharges the lien of 
the insured mortgage . . . " 
Further, paragraph 2(b) of the policy provides that: 
"The coverage of this policy shall continue in 
force so long as such insured retains an 
estate or interest in the land . . . " 
This language clearly affords coverage in the present 
case. In fact, the whole purpose of a lender's title policy is 
to insure the lender that if the borrowers fail to pay the loan 
and the lender acquires the property through foreclosure, that 
the lender will have good title to the property. 
Further, David Hodgson, the attorney who investigated and 
denied the claim on behalf of Title Guarantee and represented 
Title Guarantee in this case, admitted in his testimony at trial 
that Pioneer's coverage remained in effect after Pioneer 
purchased Lake Meadows. [R. 606-690] The language of the policy 
4 
and the admission of Mr. Hodgson end the controversy. 
Even if the court were to find that the policy was 
ambiguous in this regard, ambiguities in an insurance 
policy are construed strictly against the insured. 
Utah Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Orville Andrews & 
Sons, 665 P.2d 1300 (Utah 1903). 
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2. The Payment Made By Title Guarantee To Pioneer Was 
Not Made Under Pioneer's Policy And Cannot Be Credited Against 
That Policy, 
The second ground siezed upon by Title Guarantee in 
attempting to deny coverage to Pioneer ./as that the February 
1902 payment of £77,000 (more than the amount of Pioneer's 
policy) made by Title Guarantee to Pioneer was allegedly made 
under Pioneer's policy, thus extinguishing any further liability 
to Pioneer under the policy. This contention ignores reality 
and was rejected by the trial court. 
As of Feoruary 1902, Pioneer owned Lake Meadows. In 
addition, Pioneer still had a first lien on the two Willowbrook 
Condominiums as security for the $77,000 debt owed to Pioneer by 
the borrowers. The evidence is undisputed that Pioneer never 
made a claim under its title policy on the two Willowbrook 
condominiums and Pioneer never had any claim that it could have 
made under that title policy on the two Willoworook condominiums 
because Pioneer was, in fact, in first position on the 
condominiums. The $77,000 payment made by Title Guarantee to 
Pioneer had absolutely nothing to do with Pioneer's policy. 
Rather, the evidence was undisputed that the borrowers 
and Rocky Mountain had fraudulently issued two other policies of 
title insurance insuring both Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart 
in first position on the same condominium units. Both Pinecrest 
Associates and Lockhart made claims on their policies against 
Title Guarantee. Title Guarantee paid Pioneer the $77,000 to 
resolve the title problems on the Pinecrest Associates and 
Lockhart policies. 
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There is simply no support, legal or factual, for the 
trial court's conclusion that the $77,000 payment can be 
credited to the Pioneer policy. Pioneer did not need or request 
protection under the title policy with respect to the 
Willowbrook condominiums. Pioneer was insured in first position 
and was, in fact, in first position. It was only Pinecrest 
Associates and Lockhart who needed and were entitled to 
protection under their policies. If Title Guarantee had not 
paid Pioneer in order to clear Pioneer's lien from the 
Willowbrook condominiums, Pioneer would simply have sold the 
condominiums at Trustee's Sale, and Title Guarantee would still 
have been liable for the Pinecrest Associates and Lockhart 
claims as well as Pioneer's claim on Lake Meadows. Title 
Guarantee cannot erase Pioneer's protection on Lake Meadows by 
paying off on other title policies. 
3. Title Guarantee Is Precluded From Raising Any Other 
Grounds For Denying Coverage Other Than Stated At The Time 
Coverage Was Denied. 
A number of courts have held that once an insurance 
company denies coverage on a specified ground, the insurance 
company may not thereafter in litigation raise any other ground 
which a reasonable investigation of the claim would have 
uncovered to support its denial of coverage. See, e.g., 
McLaughlin v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 
434 (II. D. Calif. 1903); Stone v. Watters, 433 S.W.2d 639 (Miss. 
1972); Armstrong v. Hannover Ins. Co. 239 A.2d 669 (Vt. 1972); 
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Dillingham Corp, v. Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co, of 
Wisconsin, 503 F.2d, 1101 (9th Cir. 1974). 
The rationale of these cases is that an insurance company 
has a duty to its insured to thoroughly investigate a claim 
before denying it, and if an insurance company is allowed to 
defend a suosequent lawsuit on grounds which it first develops 
during discovery, the insurance company's incentive to fulfill 
its duty to investigate would be significantly reduced. 
In the present case, Title Guarantee sought to raise in 
this litigation the additional grounds for denying coverage that 
the title policy was only in effect so long as a debt was owed 
to Pioneer and that by obtaining the original title policy from 
Pioneer at the time Title Guarantee paid Pioneer on other 
policies in February, 1932, Pioneer's title policy was 
extinguished. Title Guarantee is precluded from raising these 
additional grounds because Title Guarantee had full knowledge of 
the facts months before Pioneer's claim was made and denied. 
4. The Additional Grounds Asserted by Title Guarantee 
for Denying Coverage are Without Merit. 
Even if Title Guarantee is entitled to assert in this 
litigation additional grounds for denying coverage, the two 
additional grounds asserted are without merit. 
First, the fact that the debt to Pioneer was paid in 
February 1902 is irrelevant. As of February 1902, Pioneer owned 
the Lake Meadows property, having purchased it for approximately 
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$01,000 in reliance on the title policy. Pioneer also had a 
first lien on the two Willowbrook condominiums as security for 
the $77,000 still owed by the borrowers. Pioneer's ownership 
interest in the Lake Meadows property and lien interest in the 
condominiums were both insured under the policy. The fact that 
the debt on the condominiums was paid, and Pioneer's lien on the 
condominiums extinguished had no effect on Pioneer's ownership 
coverage on Lake Meadows. Paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b) of the 
policy quoted above [Ex. P-3] expressly provide that coverage 
continued after Pioneer acquired title to Lake Meadows and as 
long as Pioneer "retains an interest or estate" in Lake 
Meadows. Indeed, under Title Guarantee's theory, any time a 
lender bids in the full amount of its debt to purchase the 
insured property at trustee's sale, the title policy is gone 
because the debt no longer exists. 
The absurdity of Title Guarantee's argument is 
demonstrated by the following hypothetical: a bank loans 
$1,000,000 secured by a Trust Deed on two properties and obtains 
a lender's title policy insuring title to the two properties. 
The values of the two properties are $950,000 and $50,000, 
respectively. The loan goes into default and the Bank holds a 
trustee's sale at which the bank, in reliance on its policy, 
purchases the first property for $950,000, leaving the bank as 
the owner of the first property with a remaining debt of $50,000 
secured by the second property. The title company realizes 
title is defective on the first property so the title company 
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voluntarily pays the remaining debt of $50,000. Under Title 
Guarantee's argument, coverage is thereby extinguished and the 
bank loses $950,000 because it can make no claim for the title 
defect on the first property. This result is nonsensical, is 
directly contradictory to the language of the lender's policy 
and was rejected by the trial court. 
Second, the fact that Pioneer, at the request of Title 
Guarantee, delivered the original title policy to Title 
Guarantee in February, 1902, did not extinguish the policy. The 
trial court rightfully rejected this argument. The evidence is 
uncontradicted that at the time Title Guarantee made the $77,000 
payment and received the title policy from Pioneer, Title 
Guarantee knew of the forged deed and of the access problem, but 
intentionally failed to disclose this information to Pioneer 
with the intent of attempting to avoid a later claim by Pioneer 
on Lake Meadows. The evidence is further uncontradicted that 
Pioneer was neither requested to nor did it agree to waive or 
relinquish any rights under the policy with respect to Lake 
Meadows. The subject was simply never discussed. A waiver of 
rights must be intentional. The trial court did not find nor is 
there any evidence that Pioneer waived any rights under the 
policy or that the policy was cancelled. 
Further, even if Pioneer had waived its rights under the 
policy, that waiver was induced by Title Guarantee's intentional 
failure to disclose to Pioneer a claim which Pioneer had under 
the policy. Title Guarantee's failure to disclose this 
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information clearly constituted a breach of its fiduciary duty 
which it owed to Pioneer and any cancellation of the policy was 
void. American Republic Life Ins. Go. v. Claybough, 302 S.W.2d 
545 (Ark. 1957); Glickman v. New York Life Ins. Co., 107 P.2d 
252 (Cal. 1940); Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group Inc., 155 Cal.Rptr. 
843 (1979) In this regard, because of the fiduciary 
relationship between the parties, the burden is upon Title 
Guarantee to show that the transaction was understood by Pioneer 
and that Title Guarantee's dealings with Pioneer were fair and 
in good faith. Perry v. McConkie, 264 P.2d 052 (Ut. 1953); 
Gordon v. Bialystaker Ctr. & Bikur Cholim. Inc., 305 N.E.2d 285 
(LI.Y. 1978). 
Title Guarantee failed to disclose this information to 
Pioneer for one simple reason. Title Guarantee knew that if it 
told Pioneer about the forged deed and the access problem and 
that Title Guarantee wanted the title policy to attempt to avoid 
any future claims, that Pioneer would have refused to give Title 
Guarantee the title policy and would have immediately made a 
claim on the policy. 
B. DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE TO PIONEER FOR FRAUDULENTLY 
ISSUING THE TITLE POLICY. 
The evidence was undisputed at trial that Douglas Church 
forged the deed to the Taylor property in order to get approval 
of Lake Meadows and obtain the loan from Pioneer. Lewis 
admittedly knew of the forgery before it occurred. Church knew 
of the forgery within a matter of a few days after it occurred. 
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notwithstanding this knowledge, none of the borrowers ever 
informed Pioneer of the forgery or of the access problem and 
knowingly caused Rocky Mountain, which they wholly owned and 
controlled, to issue the fraudulent policy of title insurance on 
or about November 19, 1979. 
In making the loan, Pioneer relied upon the fact that 
Lake Meadows was a valid subdivision and that the borrowers had 
title to the Taylor property providing access to the 
subdivision. Pioneer would not have made the loan or 
subsequently purchased Lake Meadows if Pioneer had known of the 
forged deed and access problem. As a result of the fraud of 
Rocky Mountain and the borrowers, Pioneer has been damaged in 
the amount of $136,451.39. 
Title Guarantee is liable for the actual damages caused 
by the fraud of its agent, Rocky Mountain. A principal is 
liable for the fraudulent acts of its agent when acting within 
the scope of his actual or apparent authority. This general 
rule applies to insurance companies. See, e.g., Couch on 
Insurance 2d, Insurer's Liability for Agent, Section 25:437. In 
this regard, where a principal entrusts a duty to his agent, the 
agent has the implied authority to do all those things which are 
within the scope of his assigned duties or reasonably and 
necessary incident thereto. Bowen v. Olsen, 576, P.2d 362 (Ut. 
1970); B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhursb, 503 P.2d 1216 (Ut. 
1972). Pioneer is entitled to recover all damages suffered as a 
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result of the fraud and is not limited to the face amount of the 
policy. Securities Service Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 
533 P.2d 1217 (Wash. 1970); Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1230 (Ut. 
1980; Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967). 
For example, in Lang v. Security Title & Trust Co., 302 
S.W.2d 326 (Tex. 1964), the local agent for Security Title 
misrepresented that certain property was free and clear when, in 
fact, two liens existed on a substantial portion of the 
property. Security Title argued that its liability had to be 
measured solely by the provisions of certain title binders which 
were issued. The court rejected this contention, stating: 
"It appearing from undisputed evidence that 
Post was local agent of Security and that his 
complained of acts were done within the scope 
of his employment and authority as such agent, 
Security is bound thereby and is liable for 
the actual damages proximately resulting 
therefrom." (Id. at 331.) 
In an effort to avoid the consequences of their fraud, 
Church and Lewis argued below that at the time the loan was 
made, all of the borrowers believed that John Taylor had orally 
agreed to a deal whereby he would convey the Taylor property to 
the borrowers, that the borrowers thought they had a valid tax 
title to the Taylor property and that they had no fraudulent 
intent in causing the forged deed to be recorded or in failing 
to inform Pioneer of the true facts. This argument is 
unavailing for at least two reasons. 
First, all of the borrowers admittedly knew during the 
first part of October, 1979, that Taylor had found out about the 
recordation of the forged deed, was extremely angry, and that no 
deal could be made with Taylor. Notwithstanding that knowledge, 
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approximately a month and a half later, the borrowers caused 
Rocky Mountain to issue the fraudulent policy of title 
insurance. The borrowers, as the sole officers, directors and 
shareholders of Rocky Mountain, clearly had a fiduciary duty to 
disclose the true facts of which they had knowledge when the 
title policy was issued. See, e.g., Eagan v. Mutual of Omaha, 
590 P.2d 452 (Gal. 1979); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title 
Co., 553 P.2d 254 (Kan. 1976). Further, even if the borrowers 
originally did act on the assumption that they had an oral 
agreement with Taylor and that they had a valid tax title, when 
they subsequently undeniably learned that they had no deal with 
Taylor and stipulated they had no title to the property, they 
were required to disclose the true facts to Pioneer regardless 
of any fiduciary relationship. 
For example, in St. Joseph Hospital v. Corbetta Gonstr. 
Co., Inc., 316 N.E.2d 51 (111. 1974), the court observed: 
"It is also well established that where one 
has made a statement which at that time is 
true but subsequently acquires new information 
which makes it untrue or misleading, he must 
disclose such information to anyone whom he 
knows to be acting on the basis of the 
original statement — or be guilty of fraud or 
deceit." [316 U.E.2d at 71] 
To the same effect, see, Mammas v. Pro Valley Townhouses Inc., 
638 P.2d 1367, 1369 (Ariz. 1981); Stevens v. Marco, 305 P.2d 
669, 683 (Calif. 1957); Restatement of Torts 2d, Sec. 551 
(2)(c); Prosser's Handbook on the Lav; of Torts, Sec. 106 (4th 
Ed. 1971). 
-24-
Second, the claim that the borrowers thought they had a 
valid tax title to the Taylor property is simply a smokescreen. 
No evidence whatsoever was presented below that the borrowers 
5 
had a valid tax title. Further, the borrowers admittedly 
knew when they obtained the loan from Pioneer that Mr. and Mrs. 
Taylor had an interest in the Taylor property. [R. 571-572] 
That is obviously why they forged the deed. In fact, when 
Taylor later filed action against the borrowers, the borrowers 
made no attempt to defend that action on the basis they had a 
tax title but rather stipulated to a judgment determining that 
they had no right, title or interest to the Taylor property and 
that they made no claim to the Taylor property. The stipulated 
Judgment was entered in October 1900, over a year before Pioneer 
purchased Lake Meadows at the Utah Valley Bank Trustee1s Sale in 
reliance upon the policy of title insurance. Pioneer was never 
informed of the Judgment to which the oorrowers had stipulated 
or of the fact that the borrowers had no title to the Taylor 
property. 
C. TITLE GUARANTEE IS LIABLE TO PIOLTEER FOR FAILURE TO 
DISCOSE PIONEER'S CLAIM. 
It is well settled that an insurance company has a 
fiduciary realtionship with its insured and is obligated to 
exercise the utmost good faith in dealing with its insured and 
The borrowers didn't even know if the property to which 
they supposedly had a tax title was all of the Taylor 
property which they needed for access. [R. 624] 
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in protecting its insured's rights under the policy. See, e.g., 
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 430 P.2d 576, 579 (Ut. 1967)? 
Utah Code Annot., Sec. 31-5-10(4) (1953); Bagan v. Mutual of 
Omaha, supra.; Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title Co., supra. 
In this regard, a fiduciary has the obligation to disclose all 
material facts to the party for whom he is a fiduciary and his 
failure to do so constitutes constructive fraud regardless of 
his intent. Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 293 (Ut. 1970). 
In the present case, Title Guarantee clearly knew of the 
forged deed and access problem by at least January of 1982. In 
fact, Douglas Church testified that he told Title Guarantee of 
these problems in the Summer or Fall of 1981. \Jhen Title 
Guarantee learned of these problems, it did not seek to protect 
Pioneer's interest or disclose the problems to Pioneer, but, 
rather, sought solely to protect its own interests by 
intentionally not disclosing this information to Pioneer and 
seeking to deprive Pioneer of its rights under the policy Dy 
obtaining the original title policy from Pioneer. Title 
Guarantee's conduct constituted clear, palpable fraud for which 
Pioneer is entitled to recover the full amount of its damages, 
not limited by the face amount of the policy. 
D. TITLE GUARANTEE IS LIABLE TO PIONEER FOR ITS BAD 
FAITH REFUSAL TO SETTLE PIONEER'S CLAIM. 
When an insurance company breaches its obligation of good 
faith and acts maliciously, fraudulently and oppresively or in 
conscious disregard of the insured's rights in refusing to pay a 
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claim, both actual and punitive damages may be awarded against 
the insurance company, Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 
1032 (Gal. 1973); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 532 P.2d 900 (Gal. 
1978); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Go., 271 lT.W.2d 360 (Wise. 
1970). The requisite intent and motivation may be proven either 
by direct evidence or by implication from the insurance 
company's actions. ITeal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., supra. , at 907, 
fn 7. Title Guarantee breached its fiduciary obligation of good 
faith to Pioneer when Title Guarantee denied Pioneer's claim on 
spurious grounds. 
The first ground asserted by Title Guarantee for denying 
Pioneer's claim, that Pioneer's acquisition of title to Lake 
Meadows extinguished Pioneer's Trust Deed and, therefore, the 
title policy, is absolutely rebutted by the express terms of the 
title policy set forth above. Title Guarantee's bad faith in 
asserting this ground for denying the claim is further 
demonstrated by the admission of their counsel, Mr. Hodgson, who 
originally denied the claim, that Pioneer was still covered 
under the policy after purchasing Lake Meadows. 
The second ground asserted by Title Guarantee, that it 
had paid Pioneer £77,000 under Pioneer's policy thereby 
extinguishing the policy is likewise baseless. Title Guarantee 
always knew, and the court found, that the $77,000 payment was 
not made under Pioneer's policy but was made to resolve the 
claims made on the policies issued to Pinecrest Associates and 
Lockhart on the condominiums. 
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E. PI QUEER IS HOT BARRCD FROM RECOVERY FOR FAILURE TO 
MITIGATE DAMAGES. 
The trial court found that Pioneer was barred from 
recovery in this action because Pioneer had failed to mitigate 
its damages by seeking alternative accesses to develop the 
property. There is absolutely no support in the record -for this 
finding. 
First, the defense of mitigation of.damages is an 
affirmative defense which a defendant must plead and prove. 
Pratt v. Bd. of Education, 564 P.2d 294 (Ut. 1977). Hone of the 
Defendants ever raised that defense in their pleadings or 
presented any evidence to supj^ ort that defense at trial. Thus, 
the trial court's finding cannot stand. 
Second, the only evidence which was presented at trial 
which would go to the mitigation of damages issue was testimony 
by Kent Nelson, the Pioneer officer in charge of the subject 
loan, that Pioneer had, in fact, attempted to negotiate with 
Taylor and to find alternative means of access to the property 
in order to ootain approval from Provo City to develop the 
property. [R. 84-05] This evidence was sufficient to show that 
Pioneer did, in fact, attempt to mitigate its damages. 
COUCLUSIOII 
The evidence was simply overwhelming at trial that from 
the very beginning the borrowers and Rocky Mountain, and later 
Title Guarantee, intentionally misrepresented and concealed the 
true facts concerning title to the Lake Meadows property from 
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Pioneer and totally ignored their fiduciary obligations to 
Pioneer in an attempt to evade their responsibilities to Pioneer 
under the title policy. The title policy has been in effect at 
all times, the policy has been breached and Pioneer has never 
received one cent on its policy. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed with directions to enter Judgment 
in favor of Pioneer for the sum of $70,000 plus interest on the 
breach of contract cause of action and for £136,451.39 plus 
interest on the fraud cause of action. In the alternative, the 
Judgment should be reversed and the case remanded for a new 
trial. 
DATED this tfJJL day of April, 1905. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
i^ te. By / m &*\%XUxjj> 
STEPll^ J B. MITCHELL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was nailed 
to the following on the yffi day of April, 1905: 
Walter P. Faber, Jr. 
Watkins & Faber 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 04109 
Frederick A. Jacknan 
Jacknan & Associates 
1325 South 000 East, Bldg. #2 
Orem, Utah 04057 
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ADDENDUM 
- 3 1 -
I'OT.ICY O F T I T I - K I N S U U A N T K 
i M i i t d b y 
The Title Guarantee Company 
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202 
BJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE, THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN SCHEDULE B A N D THE PRO-
TONS OF THE CONDITIONS A N D STIPULATIONS HEREOF, THE TITLE GUARANTEE COMPANY, a Maryland 
poration, herein called the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, not exceeding the 
junt of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys* fees and expenses which the Company may become obligated to paj 
eunder, sustained or incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as stated therein; 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. gck of_£jjgJTt^fjccesT to and from the lane 
4. L^gmarketability of such title; ~ 
5. The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest except to the extent that 
such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof, arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage and is 
based upon 
a. usury, or 
b. any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law; 
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage; 
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material vhich now has gained or hereafter may gain priority over the lien of the insured mort-
gage, t^ctpt any such lien arising from an improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to Date of 
Policy not financed in ^hole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage which at Date of 
Policy the insured has ad\anced or is obligated to advance; or 
8. The invalidity- or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A, of the insured mortgage or the failure of said as-
signment to vest title to the insured mortgage in the named insured assignee free and clear of all liens. 
EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy: 
1. Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting or 
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location of 
any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction io the dimen-
sions or area of the land, or the efrect of any violation of any such law, ordinance or go\ernmentaI regulation. 
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in the 
public records at Date of Policy. 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claim-
ant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured claimant either at Date of 
Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estate or interest insured by this policy or acquired the insured mortgage and 
not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant to the Company prior to the date such insured claimant became an insured 
hereunder; (c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; (d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy 
(except to the extent insurance is afforded herein as to any statutory lien for labor or material). 
4. Unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage because of failure of the insured at Date of Policy or of any subsequent 
o^ner of the indebtedness to comply with applicable "doing business" laws of the state in which the land is situated. 
WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this poliq' to be signed and sealed, to become valid when countersigned by a 
ating officer or agent of the Company, all in accordance with its By-Laws. 
Issued by 
^OCKY MOUNTAIN TITLE & ABSTRACT COMPANY 
The Title Guarantee Company 
V _ X ^ President 
ATTEST : 
>2Z6 
This policy valid only if Schrdules A and B atr attached. 
S J Secretary 
I I I ! I O I A I f i t * * * . ! M >K l l l f V 
V A I l l > O N t Y }f M I H D U I I S A A, II A K I M U m i M H A, rACMM Y/Z^V " ^ , , M > U 1 I  A * 1% AHI l -OIIO I N ( M I ) I N ( . Ht^K I'M 
—i-1 V - - J L 3 0 ' * . " - A l l AC H I D IO ALrA LOAN J-OL1CY-! OHM M M V 7 0 T o o n n 
DATL OK POLICY. SCHEDULE A AMOUNT 
November 19 , 1979 a t 11:44 P.M. NAME OF INSURED 70,000.00 
WESTERN HOME BANK 
1. The estate or interest in the land identified in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is: 
Fee Sijnple 
2 The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in: 
DOUGLAS W. CHURCH, DH3JIS G. CHURCH, JAY E . LEWIS, and RAY M. MAAG 
3 The mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as follows: 
A Deed of Trust dated October 4, 1979, executed by D0UGIAS W. CHURCH * 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, and RAY M. MAAG as Trustor, to 
secure payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of 
$70,000.00 with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, to 
WESTERN HOME RANK, as Trustee, in favor of WESTESN HOME BANK, a Utah 
Corporation, as Beneficiary, recorded November 19, 1979 as Entry 
No. 45164 of Official Records. 
The land referred to in this policy is described as set forth in the mortgage above mentioned, and identified as follows: 
The following described real property is situated in Utah County, 
State of Utah, to-wit: 
PARCEL 1: All of Lots 1 to 57, inclusive, Plat "A", LAKE MEADOWS 
SUBDIVISION, a subdivision, of Provo, Utah, according to the official 
plat thereof on file in the office of the County Recorder of Utah 
County, State of Utah. 
PARCEL 2: F-1455-61-1 Building 4 J Floor 3, Unite B, VttLLOWBROOK HILL 
CONDOMINIUMS, Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof 
and subject to the recitals thereon on file in the office of the County 
Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah. 
PARCEL 2: F-l466-61-1 Building 5, Floor 1, Unite D, WILE£WBHD0K HILL 
CONDOMINIUMS, Provo, Utah, according to the official plat thereof 
and subject to the recitals thereon on file in the office of the County 
Recorder of Utah County, State of Utah. 
* *** * *** * 
The Title Guarantee Company 
J ' » 1 • 1 0
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Tins J*olicy d(^-s not insure against loss or ddmagc by reason of tV»c following 
PART I 1. Taxes or assessments which ire not shown as rxistjn£ liens by the r«urds of any taxing authont> that Irues 
taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records 
2 Any dcti, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the public records buf which could be ascertained 
by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
4. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which t correct 
survey would disclose, and which are not shown by the public records 
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water 
rights, claims or title to water. 
6. Possible unfiled mechanics* and materialmen's liens 
7. Trie dower, curtesy, homestead, community property, or other statutory marital rights, if any, of the spouse of any 
individual Insured. 
PART II 
1* fexes for the year 1979 now due and payable but will not become 
delinquent until November 30, 1979. 
2. Any Special Assessments levied for the year 1979 are shown current, 
but this Policy does not insure against possible future Assessments 
levied for the balance of the year 1979 and subsequent years. 
3. AFFECTS PARCEL 1: An Easement over and across said property, 
August 7, 1978 and executed by CLAVIN GRAY and HELEN GRAY, in 
favor of UTAH Power and light company recorded October 3, 1978 
as Entry No. 39800 in Book 1685 at page 711 of Official Records. 
4. AFFECTS PARCELS 2 and 3: Annual maintenance assessments, special 
maintenance assessments penalties, administrative assessments 
and interest or costs unpaid which ray have been levied or assessed 
by willowbrook hill condominiLITIS ho: eaters association. 
AFFECTS PARCEL 1: A Deed of Trust, executed by DOUGLAS W. CHURCH, 
DENNIS G. CHURCH, JAY E. LEWIS, RAY M. MAAG as Trustor, to secure 
payment of a note bearing even date thereof in the sum of $65,000.00 
with interest thereon, payable as therein provided, to UTAH VALLEY 
BANK, as Trustee, in favor of UTAH VALLEY BANK, as Beneficiary, 
recorded May 11, 1979 as Entry No. 18090 of Official Records. 
6. Rights of way for any roads, ditches, canals, or transmission 
lines new existing over, under, or across said property. 
* *** * *** * 
mntersigned: 
sulfating Officer or Agent 
The Title Guarantee Company 
5. 
^ 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
1. Definition of Terms 
The following terms when used in this policy mean: 
(a) "insured": the insured named in Schedule A. The term "insured" 
also includes ( i ) the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage and each successor in ownership of such indebtedness (reserving, 
however, ail rights and defenses as to any such successor who acquires the 
indebtedness by operation of law as distinguished from purchase including, 
but not limited to, heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, personal repre-
sentatives, next of kin or corporate or fiduciary successors that the 
Company would have had against the successor's transferor), and further 
includes (ii) any governmental agency or instrumentality which is an 
insurer or guarantor under an insurance contract or guaranty insuring or 
guaranteeing said indebtedness, or any part thereof, whether named as an 
insured herein or not. and (iii) the parties designated in paragraph 2 (a) 
of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage here-
under. 
(c ) "knowledge": actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge nr 
notice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of any public 
records. 
(d) "land": the land described, specifically or by reference in Sched-
ule A, and improvements affixed thereto which by law constitute real 
property; provided, however, the term "land" does not include any prop-
erty beyond the lines of the area specifically described or referred to in 
Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest, estate or easement in abutting 
streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing herein 
shall modify or limit the extent to which a right of access to and from the 
land is insured by this policy. 
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other security 
instrument. 
(f) "public records": those records which by law impart construe-
live notice of matters relating to said land. 
I 2, (a) Continuation of Insurance after Acquisition of Title 
J This policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of, an 
['Insured)who acquires all or any part of the estate or interest in the land 
J described in Schedule A by foreclosure, trustee's sale, conveyance in lieu 
Is of foreclosure, or other legal manner which discharges the lien of the in-sured mortgage, and if the insured is a corporation, its transferrer of the ii estate or interest so acquired, provided the transferee is the parent or 
I wholly owned subsidiary of the insured; and in favor of any governmental 
II agency or instrumentality which acquires all or any part of the estate or 
I interest pursuant to a contract of insurance or guaranty insuring or 
|J guaranteeing the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage; provided 
I that the amount of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, exclusive 
Ii of costs, attorneys* fees and expenses which the Company may become 
II obligated to pay, shall not exceed the least of: 
u ( i ) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A: 
n (ii) the amount of the unpaid principal of the indebtedness as defined 
jl in paragraph 8 hereof, plus interest thereon, expenses of fore-
II' closure and amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured 
Ii mortgage and secured by said insured mortgage at the time of 
II acquisition of such estate or interest in the land; or 
* 1 (iii) the amount paid by any governmental agency or instrumentality. 
i J if such agency or instrumentality is the insured claimant, in the 
J l acquisition of such estate or interest in satisfaction of its insur-
11 ance contrail or guaranty. 
(b) Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Title 
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Polity 
in favor of an insured so long as such injured retains an esUte or 
interest in the land, or hold* an indebtedness secured by a purchase money 
mortgage given by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as such 
insured shall have liability by reason of covenant* of warranty made by 
such insured in any transfer or conveyance of such estate or interest; pro-
vided, however, this policy shall not continue in forte in favor of any 
purchaser from such insured of cither said estate or interest or the in-
debtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured. 
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions—Notice of Claim to be given 
by an Insured Qaimant 
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall 
provide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of actiof 
or proceedings commenced against such insured, or defenses, restrainir 
orders or injunctions interposed against a foreclosure of the insur< 
mortgage or a defense interposed against an insured in an action to en/on 
a contract for a sale of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgag 
or a sale of the estate or interest in said land, to the extent that su< 
litigation is founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or oth 
matter insured against by this policy. 
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (i) i 
case any action or proceeding is begun or defense or restraining order ( 
injunction is interposed as set forth in (a) above, (ii) in case knowledj 
shall <ome to an insured hereunder of any claim of title or interest whi< 
is adverse to the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insure 
mortgage, as insured, and which might cause loss or damage for whit 
the G>mpany may be liable by virtue of this policy, or (iii) if title to ti 
estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, is r 
jected as unmarketable. If such prompt notice shall not be given to ti 
Company, then as to such insured all liability of the Company shall cei! 
and terminate in regard to the matter or matters for which such prom] 
notice is required; provided, however, that failure to notify shall in c 
case prejudice the rights of any such insured under this policy unless ti 
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the c 
tent of such prejudice. 
(c) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute ar 
without undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do u 
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to esublu 
the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, i 
insured, and the Company may take any appropriate anion under ti 
terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and sha 
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy. 
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or intc 
posed a defense as required or permitted by the provisions of this polic 
the Company may pursue any such litigation to final determination by 
court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in i 
sole discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order. 
(e) In all cases where the policy permits or requires the Company 1 
prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or proceeding, tl 
insured hereunder shall secure to the Company the right to so prosecu 
or provide defense in such action or proceeding, and all appeals thereii 
and permit the Company to use, at its option, the name of such insure 
for such purpose. Whenever requested by the Company, such insured sha 
f;ive the Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, i 
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or prosecutir 
or defending such action or proceeding, and the Company shall srimbur 
such insured for any expense so incurred. 
4. Notice of Loss—Limitation of Action 
In addition to the no J ices required under paragraph 3(b) of the 
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or darna^  
for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this policy shall i 
furnished to the Company within 90 days after such loss or damage sha 
have been determined and no right of action shall accrue to an insurt 
claimant until 30 days after such statement shall have been furnish© 
Failure to furnish such statement of loss or damage shall terminate ax 
liability of the Company under this policy as to such loss or damage. 
5. Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise, «*ttle for or t 
the name w an insured claimant any claim insured against or to term ina 
allliahility and obligations of the Company hereunder by .^^ iyjjQg.j 
tendering payment oj thc__amount oCJnsurajnce. under this polio* togcth 
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred up to the time i 
such payment or tender" of payment, by the insured claimant ax 
authorized |>y the Company. In case loss or damage is claimed__^ridcr th 
policy by an insured, the Company shall have thcCfjirther option]? 
purchase MUJI jjiujL-htcdncss for the amount owing thereon together wji 
alf costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company is obligate 
hereunder to pay. If the Company offers to purchase said indebtedness -
herein provided; the owner of such indebtedness shall transfer smd assii. 
said indebtedness and the mortgage and any collateral securing the sat: 
to the Company upon payment therefor as herein provided. 
CONTINUED ON HACK 
( OVDITH/NS \NJ> Srii 'M/.TIOVS—rmitinu-<l 
D# I frmirat ion nnd Pavmrnl of J <»*' 
!..«.» j:«' j jv4-j>i*j j . u« . . a J J be haj>ii»i> oi UK Company un..i 
ecd the least of 
i) the actual loss of the insured claimant, or 
11) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A. or. if applicant, 
the amount of insurance as defined in paragraph 2(a) hereof, or 
(in) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage 
as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the tune the lo&sjpr 
damage insured against hereunder^occurs, together with interest 
thereon. ~ " 
(b) The Company will pzyt in addition to any loss insured against by 
is policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation carried on by 
r Company for such insured, and all costs, attorney' fees and expenses 
litigation carried on b> such insured with the written authorization of 
c Company. 
(c) When HabiJity^riaxJ>een definitely fixed in accordance *ith tin: 
indtttons of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable within 3*> 
lys thereafter. 
Limitation of Liability 
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this polity <a) if the 
jOmganj, after having received notice of an alleged defect, lien or 
ncumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or otherwise, re-
moves such defect, lien or encumbrance or establishes the title, or thv hen 
"f the insured mortgage", as insured, within a reasonable.time after receipt 
>f such notice; (b) in the event of litigation until there has been a final 
letcrmination by i court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all 
tppeals therefrom, adverse to the title or to the lien of the insured 
nortgage, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof, or (c) for 
iability voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or suit 
withourpnor written consent of the Company. 
8. Reduction of Liability 
(a) All payments under this policy, except payments made for costs, 
attorneys' fees and expenses, shall reduce the amount of the insurance pro 
unto; provided, however, such payments, prior to the acquisition of title* 
to said estate or interest as provided in paragraph 2(a) of these Condi-
tions and Stipulations, shall not reduce pro tanto the amount of the in-
surance afforded hereunder except to the extent that such payments reduce 
the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage 
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release of the 
insured mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company except as 
provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof. 
(b) The .liability, of the Company shall not be increased by additional 
principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy, except as to 
amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured mortgage mi secured"" 
thereby.. """""" " -—-—---—-----------—-— -
No payment shall be made without producing this policy for endorse-
ment of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, in which 
case proof of loss or destruction shall be furnished to the satisfaction of 
the Company. 
9. Liability Noncumulattve 
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfaction of 
fit iii.l< »»i» .in'\<» M K i m l by the insured fit'»ri/*.i/*t o f ,in> part thereof, it is 
.»• « I M - H - 1 1f.<* t t f J* •••Mil •»• I . . . . 'r r t l l lS |»i»|» * j l 
N Hdmt'i f»j .my amount the < ottipttiy m<y y.iy umfer any , *#lic> 
insutin.: J .»• »itg.igc lirtcafler cxemud l»y an insured sshith is a charre or 
Iirn on ll« i sUle or interest descnlxd oi referred in m Schedule A. znd 
the amount so paid shall In- deemed .i payment coder this policy 
10. Subrogation U|K>n Paytticitf or Sittlrinrnt 
Whem-ser the Company shall have settled a claim under this policy, all 
right of subrogation shall \est in the Company unaffected, by any act of 
the insured claimant, except that the owner of the indebtedness secured by 
the insured mortgage may release or substitute the personal liability of any 
debtoi or gu.uantor, or extend or otherwise modif) the terms of payment, 
or release a portion of the estate or interest from the lien of the insured 
mortgage, or release any collateral security for the indebtedness, provided 
such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice of any claim ai 
title ttr interr*st ad\i rsr to the title to the tstate or interest or the priority 
of the Inn of the injured mortgage and does not result in any loss of 
priority of the IICT of the insured mortgage. The Company shall be 
subrogated to and be entitled to all rights and remedies which such 
insured claimant would have had ag3inst any person or property in respect 
to smh claim had this policy not been issued, and it requested by the 
Company, such insured claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights 
and remedies again*t any person or property necessary in order to perfect 
such right of subrogation and .shall permit the Company to use the name 
of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation involving such 
rights or remedies If the payment does not cover the loss of such insured 
claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to such rights and remedies 
in the proportion which said payment bears to the amount of said loss, but 
such subrogation shall be in subordination to the insured mortgage. If loss 
of priority should result from any act of such insured claimant, sjch act 
shall not void this policy, but the Gimpany, in that event, shall be re-
quired to pay only that part of any losses insured against hereunder which 
shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company by reason of the im-
pairment of the right of subrogation 
11. Liability Limited to this Policy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instruments, 
tf any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy and contract 
between the insured and the Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and 
which arises out of the status of the lien of the insured mortgage or of 
the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or any action asserting 
such claim, shall be restricted to the provisions and conditions and stipu-
lations of this policy. 
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made exceptor 
writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President, 
a Vkc President, titer Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating orricer 
or authorized signatory of the Company. 
12. Nonces, Where Sent 
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in 
writing required to be furnished the Company shall be addressed to 
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